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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case seems at first blush to be about the validity 
of the sale of legal claims listed as assets in a bankruptcy 
estate, but, at this point, it is really about whether such merits 
issues have been preserved for present review.  The appointed 
Trustee reached an agreement to sell the claims to certain of 
the debtor’s creditors (the “Creditor Group”1).  After the 
Trustee sought court approval of the sale, the parties against 
whom the claims are now being asserted (the “Pursuit 
Parties”2) objected to the sale and sought to purchase the 
                                              
1 The creditors involved in the agreement are as 
follows: 1) Harris, O’Brien, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP; 2) 
Reed Smith LLP; 3) Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P.; 4) 
Claridge Associates, LLC; 5) Jamiscott LLC; 6) Leslie 
Schneider and Lilian Schneider, individually and as 
representatives of Leonard Schneider’s estate.  The notice of 
appeal lists as interested parties the following: Reed Smith, 
LLP; Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P.; Claridge Associates, 
LLC; Jamiscott LLC; Leslie Schneider; Lilian Schneider; and 
the Estate of Leonard Schneider.  Appellants state that the 
creditors are “mostly former limited partners in funds for 
which the Debtor acted as general partner and who were 
already engaged in litigation with the former princip[al]s of 
the Debtor[.]”  (Opening Br. at 5.)  The Trustee describes 
them as “the Debtor’s two non-insider creditor 
constituencies.”  (Answering Br. at 4.)   
 
2 The Pursuit Parties are the appellants and consist of 
Anthony Schepis, Frank Canelas, Pursuit Investment 
Management, LLC, Pursuit Opportunity Fund I, L.P., and 
Pursuit Capital Management Fund I, L.P.     
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claims themselves.  The various players engaged in 
negotiations and a bidding process, and the Trustee eventually 
decided to sell the claims to the Creditor Group for $180,001.  
Over objections raised by the Pursuit Parties, the Bankruptcy 
Court approved the sale.  The Pursuit Parties did not seek a 
stay, and the sale closed.  The Creditor Group then 
immediately sued on the claims in the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
The Pursuit Parties appealed to the District Court, 
challenging, among other things, the Trustee’s ability to sell 
the claims.  The District Court dismissed the appeal as 
statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), because the 
Pursuit Parties had not obtained a stay and their requested 
remedy, if entered, would affect the validity of the sale.  The 
Pursuit Parties now appeal to us.  Like the District Court, we 
conclude that the appeal is statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(m) and must therefore be dismissed. 
 
I. Background3 
 
 A. The Bankruptcy Filing and Initial  
  Agreement 
 
Pursuit Capital Management, LLC (“Pursuit” or the 
“Debtor”) is a Delaware limited liability company and former 
                                                                                                     
 
3 We recite the background according to the factual 
findings of the Bankruptcy Court, none of which have been 
shown to be clearly erroneous.  See Cinicola v. 
Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 115 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We 
review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard[.]”). 
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general partner in investment funds.  Anthony Schepis and 
Frank Canelas founded Pursuit and acted as its managing 
members.  Pursuit in turn formed Pursuit Capital 
Management Fund I, L.P. and, later, Pursuit Opportunity 
Fund I, L.P.  Those two funds were created to “acquire 
securities for trading and investment appreciation.”  (Opening 
Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Docket No. 8 at 5, 
Claridge Assocs., LLC v. Schepis (In re Pursuit Capital 
Management, LLC), No. 16-50083 (Bankr. D. Del.) 
(hereinafter “In re Pursuit”).)  They “invest[ed] substantially 
all of their assets in offshore entities formed under the laws of 
the Cayman Islands.”  (Id.)  Pursuit was the general partner of 
those entities and focused on their day-to-day management.   
 
Pursuit voluntarily petitioned for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
on March 21, 2014, after it became liable on legal judgments 
for $5 million.  Jeoffrey L. Burtch was appointed as the 
Trustee of the Pursuit estate.  When Pursuit filed its schedules 
of assets and statements of financial affairs, it listed 
essentially no assets but indicated that it had a “[p]otential 
indemnification claim” against one of the funds it managed 
(JA at 84), as well as claims connected to two other cases.  
The financial statements revealed that Pursuit’s gross income 
for 2011 was $645,571.22 from Pursuit Capital Management 
Fund I, L.P., “which was subsequently transferred to 
[Pursuit’s] members” in early 2013.  (JA at 102.)  According 
to the Creditor Group, Schepis and Canelas, as the sole 
owners and managers of the company, “enrich[ed] themselves 
at the expense of the Debtor’s creditors, and engaged in 
corporate machinations to avoid paying money owed to the 
Debtor[.]”  (Complaint, In re Pursuit, Docket Nos. 1 & 2.)  
More specifically, the Creditor Group said that Schepis and 
Canelas “secretly transferred to themselves ... $645,571 in 
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cash held in the Debtor’s bank account, in exchange for no 
consideration.”  (Id.)  That transfer may trigger an avoidance 
claim under the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a trustee to 
rescind certain transfers of property from a debtor’s estate.  
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, and 548.  According to the 
Trustee, selling the potential avoidance claim was advisable 
because the bankruptcy estate had no funds available to 
“administer the estate, let alone [to] pursue the claim[] and 
litigation[.]”  (JA at 181.)   
 
The Trustee negotiated with the Creditor Group, and, 
on March 2, 2015, he filed a motion for a court order 
approving an agreement to “settle, transfer and assign” the 
avoidance claim and other potential claims to that group.4  
(JA at 182.)  The Creditor Group agreed to purchase the 
claims for $125,000 in exchange for a concession that it 
“shall be permitted to bring the ... [c]laims in the Bankruptcy 
Court, and [is] deemed to have standing to bring such claims 
in the Bankruptcy Court.”  (Id.)  The Trustee stated in his 
motion for approval of the sale that, “[i]n [his] business 
judgment, the [Creditor Group’s offer] represent[ed] a fair 
                                              
4 All told, the claims at issue against Pursuit and its 
affiliates include the following: “claims asserted in ... [a 
separate action] (the ‘New York action’);” potential 
indemnification claims against Pursuit Capital Management 
Fund I, L.P.; the potential avoidance claim; and an asserted 
interest in potential proceeds from a then-pending separate 
litigation called the “UBS litigation[.]”  (JA at 495-98.)  The 
primary focus here is on the avoidance claim.  The Creditor 
Group is currently pursuing the claims as “fraudulent 
transfers ... [p]ursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548[.]”  (In re 
Pursuit, Docket No. 1 at 23-24).)   
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and reasonable price for the claims[.]”  (JA at 185.)  The 
Trustee also stated that he was willing to entertain “additional 
proposals for the assets on similar terms” as an “additional 
test of ... fairness[.]”  (JA at 188.) 
 
Ten days later, on March 12, 2015, the Pursuit Parties 
filed an objection to the Trustee’s sale motion, arguing 
primarily that a lack of good faith undermined the fairness of 
the agreement, and that the deal did not maximize the value 
of the estate.  In light of that objection, the Bankruptcy Court 
directed that the Trustee entertain purchase offers from the 
Pursuit Parties.  After discussions between the Trustee and 
the Pursuit Parties, during which the Pursuit Parties offered 
$147,500 for the claims, the Trustee decided that an auction 
was the best means to maximize value for the estate.  He 
sought and received the Bankruptcy Court’s permission to 
conduct one.   
 
 B. The Auction 
 
 To establish ground rules, the Trustee filed a motion 
for approval of proposed auction procedures, including a 
provision that the Trustee be allowed to modify the 
procedures “as he deem[ed] appropriate to comply with his 
fiduciary obligation[,]”5 to determine in his “sole discretion” 
the highest and best bid, to reject any bid that he deemed 
                                              
5 “The Trustee proposes that the auction of the Estate’s 
assets be governed by the following procedures ... subject to 
modification by the Trustee as he deems appropriate to 
comply with his fiduciary obligation[.]”  (JA at 241.)  
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inadequate,6 and to negotiate individually or openly with each 
bidder.7  (JA at 241.)  The Bankruptcy Court approved that 
motion “in [its] entirety.”  (JA at 254.) 
 
The auction took place by teleconference on July 7, 
2015, with the Pursuit Parties and the Creditor Group as the 
only interested bidders.  The Trustee initially stated that the 
Pursuit Parties’ prior offer of $147,500 was the highest and 
best, and the bidding proceeded from there in $10,000 
increments.  Before it could be concluded, the auction 
abruptly adjourned because the lawyer for the Pursuit Parties 
asserted that he had a scheduling conflict.8  But, the Trustee 
                                              
6 “The Trustee reserves the right to (i) determine in his 
sole discretion which bid(s) is/are the highest and otherwise 
best, and (ii) reject at any time, without liability, any bid that 
the Trustee, in his business judgment, deems to be (1) 
inadequate or insufficient, (2) not in conformity with the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules or 
these procedures, or (3) contrary to the best interests of the 
Estate[.]”  (JA at 242.) 
 
7 “The auction may include individual negotiations 
with each bidder and/or open bidding; provided, however, 
that all bids shall be made and received in one room, on an 
open basis, and each bidder shall be entitled to be present for 
all bidding, and all material terms of each bid shall be fully 
disclosed to all bidders[.]”  (Id.)  
 
8 An acrimonious tone arose early in the auction 
process when the Pursuit Parties’ counsel, Peter Cane, refused 
to identify his clients during the introductory appearances at 
the teleconference.  Then the auction was adjourned when 
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Mr. Cane hung up to attend a scheduling conference in a 
related case.  The following exchange between Mr. Cane and 
Jon Harris, counsel to the Creditor Group, took place before 
the auction adjourned:  
 
Mr. Cane: So you know, I have a conference 
with the New York court at three o’clock at Jon 
Harris’s request, and we agreed to it.  I am not 
going to skip that.  The Court scheduled it. 
 
Mr. Harris: That is a scheduling conference.  
Sarah Coleman can handle that, or anyone else, 
and I’m sure it will be quite brief as well. 
 
Mr. Cane: Don’t tell me who can handle what.  
This is about sanctions against you for 
fraudulently misrepresenting facts to the court.  
Don’t make it worse for yourself. 
 
(Recess) 
 
Mr. Felger: [Mr. Cane], are you on the line?  
How about Sarah?  I’m hearing nothing.  I 
received an e-mail from [Mr. Cane] at 3:27.  It 
says, “Mark, the New York court has asked us 
to try again at four o’clock, which means I need 
to call my adversary at 3:55.  I am not sure how 
long it will take.  I know I will be completely 
clear, as will my client, between 8:30 and nine 
o’clock, so I suggest we resume then if that is 
agreeable to everyone else.  As you said, these 
auctions often go to midnight[.]”   
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stated before adjourning that the Pursuit Parties’ last bid of 
$170,000 was preferred to any others that had been made to 
that point.   
 
The Trustee subsequently proposed eight alternative 
dates as options to reconvene the auction, though none was 
acceptable to all of the parties.  Instead of postponing the 
process further, on July 24, 2015, the Trustee requested final 
sealed bids from the parties, to be delivered no later than 
July 30, 2015.  On that date, the Trustee received one sealed 
bid from the Creditor Group for $180,001 and he received 
nothing from the Pursuit Parties.  In fact, not only did the 
Pursuit Parties fail to submit a bid, they also informed the 
Trustee that they were withdrawing their prior bids from 
consideration.  Not surprisingly, then, the Trustee agreed to 
sell the claims to the Creditor Group, after some additional 
negotiations and modifications to the bid.  A day later, the 
Trustee announced that he would seek approval of the sale 
agreement at a hearing on August 10, 2015.   
 
The sale agreement between the Trustee and the 
Creditor Group specified that the Creditor Group would 
acquire a set of claims, including the avoidance claim that is 
the primary focus of the merits arguments in this case.  The 
agreement also stated that the Creditor Group would pursue 
the claims “at their cost and expense [and] ... [a]ny net 
recovery will be paid into the estate for distribution to all 
creditors[.]”  (JA at 423-24.)  Additionally, the agreement 
contained no representations or warranties regarding the 
                                                                                                     
 
(JA at 399-400.) 
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claims, and they were to be sold on an “as is[,] where is” 
basis.  (JA at 501.) 
 
 Before the date of the sale approval hearing, the 
Pursuit Parties filed a motion to adjourn it, which prompted a 
hearing to address that request.  The Trustee stated at that 
time that he had been prepared to move forward with the 
Creditor Group’s sealed bid, but he was wavering because the 
Pursuit Parties had just “made a new offer” by email that had 
different terms from their previous offer and was for “a 
higher dollar amount than the proposal by the [C]reditor 
[G]roup.”9  (JA at 492, 514.)  Citing the “difficult spot” that 
he was in because “[his] job ... is to maximize value[,]” the 
Trustee deferred to the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment, stating 
that he was not opposed to a temporary adjournment so long 
as a definitive date was set to resolve the matter.  (JA at 514-
16.)  The Creditor Group strongly opposed the Pursuit 
Parties’ motion for an adjournment, arguing that there had 
been delay enough, that each delay harmed the value of the 
claims they sought to purchase, and that they should prevail 
in the auction because they had abided by the rules during the 
final sealed bidding process.   
 
The Bankruptcy Court rejected the Pursuit Parties’ 
request to adjourn the sale hearing.  The Court stressed that 
the Pursuit Parties did not submit a final bid when requested 
and that there was concern with “the way th[e] Court and 
other parties’ schedules and th[e] Court’s orders [were] being 
ignored, to some extent, by the Pursuit Parties.”  (JA at 521.)  
The Bankruptcy Court thus ruled that the sale hearing would 
                                              
9 That new offer amounted to $200,000.   
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go forward and, if the Trustee wanted to change his mind 
about selling to the Creditor Group, he could do so.  After 
that hearing, the Pursuit Parties made a new offer of $220,000 
to the Trustee, again via email, conditioned on the Trustee 
declaring the Pursuit Parties to be the prevailing bidder.  The 
Trustee ultimately rejected that offer.   
 
C. The Sale Approval Hearing 
 
The hearing to approve the sale took place on 
August 10, 2015.  At the outset, the Pursuit Parties asked the 
Court to reopen the auction rather than proceed with the 
hearing.  They then and there presented the Trustee with yet 
another offer – apparently one that had not been discussed 
previously – in the amount of $205,750 and with modified 
terms that would “settle[] ... [the] avoidance claim[.]”10  (JA 
at 441-43.)  After reviewing the new offer, the Trustee again 
acknowledged that he was in a difficult situation, but then 
stated that he was “prepared to move forward on the motion 
[to approve the sale agreement,]” if the Court agreed, 
because, “in the end ... the few dollars won’t make a bit of 
difference to the creditors of th[e] estate, and the creditors of 
th[e] estate are in the [C]reditor [G]roup[.]”11  (JA at 449.)  
                                              
10 The bid was lower monetarily than the last one the 
Pursuit Parties had made, but it contained new terms that the 
Pursuit Parties presumably viewed as more valuable.  
 
 11 The Trustee noted that, if the Pursuit Parties’ offer 
were accepted, the estate would lose out on the potential 
recovery that would return to it under the deal with the 
Creditor Group, which involved the bankruptcy estate sharing 
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 The Bankruptcy Court, after reviewing the history of 
the case, including the Pursuit Parties’ litigating and bidding 
behavior, rejected their request to reopen the auction.  The 
sale approval hearing continued with the Court allowing the 
Trustee to testify and be subject to cross-examination.  While 
cross-examining the Trustee, counsel for the Pursuit Parties 
attempted to present yet another offer, this time for $250,000, 
but the Court did not permit counsel to bid “from the 
podium.”  (JA at 471.)  After the Trustee’s testimony, the 
Pursuit Parties laid out, among other arguments, three 
objections to approval of the sale motion: 1) the bid accepted 
by the Trustee was not the highest bid; 2) the auction 
procedures had not been complied with; and 3) an avoidance 
claim cannot be prosecuted by parties other than the trustee, 
in a Chapter 7 context.   
 
 The Trustee countered by stating that the Creditor 
Group’s bid was the best and highest that was offered “in 
accordance with the rules.”12  (JA at 484.)  He agreed that the 
claim was sold on an “as-is, where-is” basis (JA at 485), but, 
                                                                                                     
in the recovery on claims against the Pursuit Parties.  That 
potential recovery is approximately $645,000.   
 
12 During their argument, the Pursuit Parties had 
emphasized that the estate was insolvent and thus a higher bid 
should be favored.  Counsel for the Trustee acknowledged 
that the estate was administratively insolvent but argued that 
it would be so regardless of whether the Trustee had accepted 
the Pursuit Parties’ offer of $205,750 offered at the start of 
the hearing.     
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at least under the Creditor Group’s bid, there was a possibility 
for recoveries from the claims that would be advanced against 
the Pursuit Parties and would “flow into the estate and be 
shared by creditors[.]  Under [the Pursuit Parties’] revised 
proposal ... there would be no opportunity for additional 
monies flowing into the estate.”  (JA at 484-85.)  The Trustee 
also argued that, when changes to the procedures were made, 
they were in accordance with the modification provision in 
those court-approved rules.  (JA at 484-86.) 
 
 When the arguments concluded, the Bankruptcy Court 
granted the Trustee’s motion to approve the sale agreement.  
The Court applied the “sound business purpose test[,]” In re 
ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d 547, 551 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing In 
re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 153-54 
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999)), and, in relevant part, found that the 
Trustee had exercised sound business judgment and that the 
sale price was fair because $180,001 – with a potential 
additional recovery – was substantially higher than the 
original $125,000 offer.  The Court also found that, because 
there was no evidence of collusion, the Trustee and the 
Creditor Group had acted in good faith.   
 
 After reviewing those factors, the Bankruptcy Court 
responded to the Pursuit Parties’ arguments and objections.  It 
reiterated its denial of the request to reopen the auction, 
reasoning that the need to uphold the integrity of the auction 
process outweighed the potential of a higher bid under the 
circumstances.  In the same vein, the Court stated that it had 
“no reason to quarrel with the trustee’s decision that the 
offers made by the Pursuit Parties subsequent to the closing 
of the auction are not highest and better[,]” taking into 
account the potential additional recovery to the estate from a 
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successful suit on the claims.  (JA at 428.)  The Court also 
rejected the Pursuit Parties’ complaint about the modification 
of the auction procedures because the Trustee had been 
empowered to make such a change when the auction 
procedures were first presented for approval.  While it agreed 
that the Pursuit Parties should be able to raise “any and all 
defenses they have to whatever litigation is brought,” the 
Bankruptcy Court did not take a position on whether an 
avoidance claim could be prosecuted by parties other than the 
Trustee.  (JA at 429.)  With that, the Court approved the sale 
and entered an order (the “Sale Order”) to that effect on 
August 27, 2015.  
 
 D. The Appeals and the Creditor Group’s  
  Assertion of the Purchased Claims 
 
The Pursuit Parties promptly appealed the Sale Order 
to the District Court.  Of utmost importance, however, they 
did so without first seeking a stay of the order.  In their 
appeal, the Pursuit Parties argue “that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in entering the Sale Order because the Trustee alone is 
authorized to prosecute the causes of action arising under the 
Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee lacked authority to assign 
the causes of action to a non-fiduciary third party.”  (JA at 
52.)  They also argue that the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of 
good faith are erroneous.  Within those arguments are 
challenges to the integrity of the auction process as well as an 
allegation that the auction procedures were applied to them 
prejudicially.   
 
Meanwhile, the Creditor Group has promptly pursued 
the claims it purchased.  They filed an adversary proceeding 
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against the Pursuit Parties in the Bankruptcy Court,13 and that 
case has progressed concurrently with the appeal of the Sale 
Order to the District Court and then the appeal to us.  In the 
adversary proceeding, the Pursuit Parties moved to dismiss, 
arguing that the Creditor Group “do[es] not own the causes of 
action asserted in the complaint and [is] not entitled to 
prosecute [it,]” (JA at 53), because avoidance powers are 
reserved “solely and exclusively” for a bankruptcy trustee.  
(JA at 52.)  In the alternative, they moved to stay the 
adversary proceedings pending their appeals.   
 
The District Court ruled that the appeal of the Sale 
Order is statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) because 
no stay had been obtained and any reversal or modification of 
the sale would naturally affect the validity of the sale.  The 
District Court also rejected the Pursuit Parties’ arguments 
attacking the good faith and the integrity of the auction 
process and its procedures.  The Court specifically declined to 
rule on whether a trustee can properly transfer avoidance 
claims and whether non-trustee parties can prosecute such 
claims.  It recognized that the Pursuit Parties were attempting 
to get a merits ruling:  
 
[I]t would seem that [a request by the Pursuit 
Parties that the Court decide the Creditor Group 
has no power to prosecute the claims even 
though they may own them] is essentially that 
[it] decide the motion to dismiss that is 
currently pending in [the] separate case before 
                                              
13 The case is Claridge Associates, LLC v. Schepis (In 
re Pursuit Capital Management, LLC), No. 14-10610, Adv. 
No. 16-50083 (Bankr. D. Del.). 
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the Bankruptcy Court.  I do not think that this is 
procedurally appropriate relief. 
 
(JA at 55.)  Instead, the District Court determined that: 
 
finding that the Trustee lacked authority to 
transfer the causes of action though not 
nullifying the sale would affect its validity and 
demonstrate that the sale was flawed.  Such a 
finding would impact the terms of the bargain 
struck by the buyer and seller.  If the 
Bankruptcy Court had declined to approve the 
sale of the causes of action, [the Creditor 
Group] would undoubtedly have valued what 
they were purchasing at a lower amount. 
 
(JA at 56 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).)  
 
 In light of the District Court’s refusal to address the 
merits, the Pursuit Parties again pressed in the Bankruptcy 
Court the issue of a trustee’s ability to transfer his avoidance 
powers.  The Bankruptcy Court requested supplemental 
briefing on that issue and conducted a hearing on it, but the 
Court has deferred ruling on the issue pending our decision in 
this appeal.  (Memorandum, In re Pursuit, Adv. No. 16-
50083, Docket No. 103.)   
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II. Discussion14 
 
 The Pursuit Parties present numerous arguments 
regarding a trustee’s ability to transfer avoidance powers, but 
we cannot consider them if the appeal of the Sale Order is 
moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  See Cinicola v. 
Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 127 n.19 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[W]e must first answer the question of statutory mootness 
before proceeding to the merits[.]”).  That is the primary issue 
before us, and we conclude that the appeal is indeed 
statutorily moot. 
 
 A. The Test 
 
Section 363(m) provides: 
 
[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an 
authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this 
section of a sale or lease of property does not 
                                              
14 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b).  The District Court heard the 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  We exercise jurisdiction 
over the District Court’s final decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d).  “Our review of the District Court’s ruling in its 
capacity as an appellate court is plenary[.]” In re Seven Fields 
Dev. Corp., 505 F.3d 237, 253 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 
O’Lexa, 476 F.3d 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2007)).  “[W]e review the 
bankruptcy judge’s legal determinations de novo,” id., “and 
‘its factual findings for clear error and its exercise of 
discretion for abuse thereof.’” Id. (quoting In re United 
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 396 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
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affect the validity of a sale or lease under such 
authorization to an entity that purchased or 
leased such property in good faith, whether or 
not such entity knew of the pendency of the 
appeal, unless such authorization and such sale 
or lease were stayed pending appeal.   
 
11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  The purpose of § 363(m) is to promote 
the finality of sales.  It provides “not only … finality to the 
judgment of the bankruptcy court, but particularly … finality 
to those orders and judgments upon which third parties rely.”  
Pittsburgh Food & Bev. Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 647-48 
(3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 
F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986)); see also In re Stadium Mgmt. 
Corp., 895 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing the 
“salutary policy of affording finality to judgments” in such 
sales (citation omitted)).  “[I]ts certainty attracts investors and 
helps effectuate debtor rehabilitation.”15  Cinicola, 248 F.3d 
                                              
15 As well put by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit:  
Section 363(m) codifies Congress’s strong 
preference for finality and efficiency in the 
bankruptcy context, particularly where third 
parties are involved.  Without the protection of 
§ 363(m), purchasers of bankruptcy estate 
assets could be dragged into endless rounds of 
litigation to determine who has what rights in 
the property.  This would not only impose 
unfair hardship on good faith purchasers, but 
would also substantially reduce the value of the 
estate.  An asset that provides a near-certain 
guarantee of litigation and no guarantee of 
20 
 
at 122 (citation omitted).  “[A]s we and other courts have 
recognized, [§] 363(m) was created to promote the policy of 
the finality of bankruptcy court orders, and to prevent harmful 
effects on the bidding process resulting from the bidders’ 
knowledge that the highest bid may not end up being the final 
sale price.”  Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 500 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Pittsburgh 
Food, 112 F.3d at 647-48). 
 
Section 363(m) applies to sales authorized under 
§ 363(b), which in turn provides that a “trustee ... may ... sell 
... other than in the ordinary course of business, property of 
the estate[.]”  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).  As relevant here, estate 
property is defined as “all legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”  11 
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  Thus a preliminary question is whether 
the property at issue – in this case, the avoidance claim – is 
“estate property” as defined by the statute.  But there are two 
problems with addressing that issue here.  First is the problem 
identified by the District Court: the transferability of the 
avoidance claim is the very merits issue that the Pursuit 
Parties should have preserved by seeking a stay but did not.  
It would be procedurally odd, and would undermine the 
policy rationale behind § 363(m), to allow parties to avoid the 
responsibility to get a stay by posing a merits issue in the 
                                                                                                     
ownership is likely to have a low sale price; by 
removing these risks, § 363(m) allows bidders 
to offer fair value for estate property. 
 
In re Rare Earth Minerals, 445 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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form of a question about estate property and the applicability 
of § 363(m).  At least that is how it strikes us in this instance, 
where the merits issue does not have an obvious answer.  If 
the requirement of a stay is to have teeth, any reasonably 
close question about the applicability of § 363(m) should be 
answered in favor of applicability.  Cf. In re Brown, 851 F.3d 
619, 622 (6th Cir. 2017) (“This mootness rule applies 
regardless of the merits of legal arguments raised against the 
bankruptcy court’s order and functions to encourage 
participation in bankruptcy asset sales and increase the value 
of the property of the estate by protecting good faith 
purchasers from modification by an appeals court of the 
bargain struck with the [trustee].” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), petition for 
cert. filed. 
 
The second problem with addressing the “estate 
property” question now is that the applicability of § 363(m) 
was not directly addressed by the parties in their briefing.16  
See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his 
opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  
Thus we will assume for the sake of analysis that § 363(m) 
does apply. 
                                              
16 The Pursuit Parties made a two paragraph pitch for 
why the avoidance claim is not estate property in an attempt 
to demonstrate that the Trustee lacked authority to transfer the 
claim.   (See Opening Br. at 27.)  The Pursuit Parties did not, 
however, argue that the avoidance claim is exempt from 
§ 363(m) because it did not fall within the meaning of “estate 
property” under that mootness statute.   
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Under our case law, § 363(m) moots a challenge to a 
sale if two conditions are satisfied: “(1) the underlying sale or 
lease was not stayed pending the appeal, and (2) the court, if 
reversing or modifying the authorization to sell or lease, 
would be affecting the validity of such a sale or lease.”17  
Krebs, 141 F.3d at 499.  Though framed as a two-part test, 
there is actually an additional step because we are first 
required to ask whether the purchaser at the sale “purchased 
... [the] property in good faith.”  § 363(m); see also Abbotts 
Dairies, 788 F.2d at 147. 
 
B. Good Faith 
 
The Pursuit Parties argue that “the sale was not 
conducted in good faith and suffered value-defeating 
irregularities[.]”  (Opening Br. at 51.)  Besides denying that 
the Creditor Group is a good-faith purchaser, they also argue 
that the Trustee “expressly discriminated against [them] 
during the auction, to the detriment of the Debtor’s estate[,]” 
and they claim that the Bankruptcy Court sanctioned that 
discrimination by approving the sale.  (Id.)  The Bankruptcy 
Court found that the parties acted in good faith because there 
was neither evidence of collusion nor anything to suggest that 
the bidding took place at less than arm’s length.  It also found 
that the Creditor Group followed the bidding procedures.  The 
                                              
17 Our test under § 363(m) is a minority position.  The 
majority of our sister circuits have adopted a “per se” rule that 
moots a challenge to a sale under § 363(m) automatically 
when a stay is not obtained.  In re Brown, 851 F.3d at 622 
(quotations omitted). 
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District Court affirmed.  An analysis of a purchaser’s good 
faith status requires a mixed standard of review: “we exercise 
plenary review of the legal standard applied by the district 
and bankruptcy courts, but review the latter court’s findings 
of fact on a clearly erroneous standard[.]”  Abbotts Dairies, 
788 F.2d at 147. 
 
As already noted, for a purchaser to claim the 
protection of § 363(m), she must have acted in good faith.  In 
re ICL Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 553 (internal quotations 
marks omitted); see also In re Tempo Tech. Corp., 202 B.R. 
363, 367 (D. Del. 1996) (“[W]here the good faith of the 
purchaser is at issue, the district court is required to review 
the bankruptcy court’s finding of good faith before dismissing 
any subsequent appeal as moot under [§] 363(m).”).  
“Unfortunately, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the 
Bankruptcy Rules attempts to define ‘good faith.’”  Abbotts 
Dairies, 788 F.2d at 147.  Courts have thus “turned to 
traditional equitable principles, holding that the phrase 
encompasses one who purchases in ‘good faith’ and for 
‘value.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  The good faith requirement: 
 
speaks to the integrity of [the purchaser’s] 
conduct in the course of the sale proceedings.  
Typically, the misconduct that would destroy a 
purchaser’s good faith status at a judicial sale 
involves fraud, collusion between the purchaser 
and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to 
take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders. 
   
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380, 390 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he good-
faith requirement prohibits fraudulent, collusive actions 
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specifically intended to affect the sale price or control the 
outcome of the sale.”). 
 
  As to value, we have said that, “[g]enerally speaking, 
an auction may be sufficient to establish that one has paid 
‘value’ for the assets of a bankrupt.”  Abbotts Dairies, 788 
F.2d at 149.  In fact, we have said that “a public auction, as 
opposed to appraisals and other evidence, is the best possible 
determinant of the value of ... assets[.]”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  But, on the facts of that case, we 
rejected a finding of good faith because there was a 
possibility that the debtor colluded with one of the bidders 
during the bankruptcy process.  See id. (reasoning that “no 
‘auction’ took place in the bankruptcy court [if it was 
predicated on collusion and] … the ‘bidding’ could not, by 
definition, serve as the final arbiter of the ‘value’ of [the 
debtor’s] assets”). 
 
Applying those principles here, we see no clear error 
in the Bankruptcy Court’s good faith finding nor any error in 
the legal standard applied.  The Pursuit Parties struggle to 
point to specific facts that support their contentions to the 
contrary.  They vaguely argue that the Trustee “discriminated 
against [them] during the auction ... [a]nd ... the Bankruptcy 
Court sanctioned this discrimination[.]”  (Opening Br. at 51.)  
They also say that the Bankruptcy Court’s finding that the 
“parties acted in good faith” does not answer “whether the 
auction was conducted in good faith[,]” and that the Trustee 
failed to provide evidence to support either conclusion.  (Id.)  
Lastly, they argue that the Trustee’s conduct relating to the 
modification of the auction procedures, and how those 
procedures were applied to the Pursuit Parties, constituted bad 
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faith.  All of those arguments are conclusory and 
unpersuasive. 
 
 1. The Good Faith Conduct of the  
  Trustee and the Creditor Group 
 
The record makes clear that the Trustee acted in 
accordance with his fiduciary obligations, rather than in 
collusion with the Creditor Group or through attempts to take 
unfair advantage of the Pursuit Parties.  The Trustee initiated 
the sale proceedings because he believed that “the sale of the 
assets [would be] a prudent exercise of his business judgment 
under the circumstances,” since there were no estate funds 
available to pursue claims in litigation.  (JA at 181, 185.)  He 
then stated in his initial motion for sale approval that he was 
willing to entertain “additional proposals for the assets on 
similar terms” as an “additional test of ... fairness.”  (JA at 
188.)  He followed through by entertaining a bid from the 
Pursuit Parties and then requesting an auction.   
 
The auction also appears to have been competitive.  
Indeed, the Trustee stated both at the beginning of the auction 
and at its adjournment that he favored the Pursuit Parties’ 
bids above any others.  That ultimately forced the Creditor 
Group to increase the value of its bids.  After proposing eight 
substitute dates to reconvene the auction, all to no avail, the 
Trustee requested final sealed bids instead of postponing the 
process further.  Not only did the Pursuit Parties fail to submit 
a bid, they withdrew their previous bids.  And, following the 
sealed bidding, the Trustee continued to negotiate privately 
and publicly with both the Creditor Group and the Pursuit 
Parties.  He ultimately decided to move forward with the sale 
to the Creditor Group, after extensive review and consultation 
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with the Bankruptcy Court about the best way to proceed.  
The Pursuit Parties failed to win at the auction not because of 
the Trustee’s conduct, but because of their own decisions 
during the bidding process.  None of that shows a lack of 
good faith or collusion on the part of the Trustee and the 
Creditor Group.  
 
Although the Pursuit Parties’ brief focuses largely on 
the conduct of the Trustee, we also note that the evidence 
indicates the Creditor Group acted in good faith.  They 
complied with the rules of the auction, submitted timely bids, 
and increased their bids when competition required it.  That is 
exactly how an auction is supposed to work. 
 
 2. Value 
 
We also conclude that appropriate value was delivered 
for the claims.  As discussed, a competitive auction strongly 
indicates that a purchaser has paid appropriate value for estate 
assets.  Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d at 149.  Unlike the 
circumstances in Abbotts Dairies, where no real auction took 
place because there had been collusion, there was competitive 
bidding here and no evidence of collusion.  Thus there is a 
sound basis for concluding that the auction satisfied the value 
element of the test for good faith.   
 
The winning final bid in this case was $180,001.  That 
was, notably, $10,001 more than the Pursuit Parties’ bid at the 
end of the live auction, before the auction was forced to 
adjourn by their scheduling conflict.  In addition to the cash 
aspect of the Creditor Group’s bid, the Bankruptcy Court 
observed that the winning bid offers the opportunity for a 
recovery to the estate, if litigation of the claims against the 
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Pursuit Parties is successful.  There was no such potential 
recovery embedded in the Pursuit Parties’ bidding because 
they seek to acquire the claims precisely so that the claims 
will not be litigated.  The Bankruptcy Court acknowledged 
that fact when it rejected the Pursuit Parties’ argument that 
the Trustee erroneously accepted a bid that was not the 
highest.  The Bankruptcy Court also decided that “the 
integrity of the auction process, by far, trumps any potential 
higher bid” because the Pursuit Parties, as experienced 
bidders, “chose not to provide a sealed bid[] ... and withdrew 
previous offers made at the auction.  (JA at 427-28.)  We 
agree with that reasoning and conclude that the Creditor 
Group purchased the claims for fair value.  
 
 3. The Modification of the Auction  
  Procedures 
 
The Pursuit Parties also argue that the “auction was 
contrary to the [court-ordered] procedures” and thus was 
conducted in bad faith.  (Opening Br. at 52.)  Specifically, 
they say that the Trustee failed to show that adjourning the 
auction and then requesting final sealed bids enabled him to 
“comply with his fiduciary obligation[,]” as required by the 
original bidding procedures.  (Opening Br. at 37.)  And they 
argue, even if the modification were proper, that the 
procedures were applied against them discriminatorily 
because the Trustee refused to negotiate with them after the 
final sealed bidding deadline.   
 
This all sounds a bit like the old story of the boy who 
shot his parents and then asked for special treatment because 
he was an orphan.  The changed auction procedures in this 
case were, in significant measure, a function of the Pursuit 
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Parties’ contentious and at times obstreperous behavior.  It is 
clear that the Trustee had the authority to move to a sealed-
bid procedure and did so precisely so that he could comply 
with his fiduciary duties.  A trustee has the duty to “close 
[the] estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best 
interests of parties in interest[.]”  11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).   The 
Trustee transitioned to the final sealed bidding process 
because, despite numerous attempts, he could not coordinate 
a date to conclude the auction under the original procedures.  
The new procedure did not discriminate against the Pursuit 
Parties.  They had ample opportunity to participate, and 
elected not to.  The Trustee also entertained multiple bids 
from the Pursuit Parties and engaged in negotiations with 
them.  Therefore, the record does not substantiate any claim 
of discrimination or bad faith regarding the auction 
procedures.  The Bankruptcy Court’s good-faith finding is 
sound. 
 
 C. The Stay and Validity Prongs 
 
Because we conclude that the sale was affected in 
good faith, we can proceed to the application of the two-
prong § 363(m) mootness test called for by our decision in 
Krebs, 141 F.3d at 499.  That test, again, calls for a finding of 
mootness if: “(1) the underlying sale or lease [that is being 
challenged] was not stayed pending the appeal, and (2) the 
court, if reversing or modifying the authorization to sell or 
lease, would be affecting the validity of such a sale or lease.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  A challenger can avoid mootness 
simply by obtaining a stay of the sale order.  When a stay is 
not obtained, mootness may still be avoided in the rare case 
when a reversal or modification of the sale order will not 
affect the validity of the sale. 
29 
 
 
  1. The Stay Requirement 
 
The first step to a holding of § 363(m) mootness under 
the Krebs test is that the challenger failed to obtain a stay of 
the sale order.  Id.  It is undisputed that the Pursuit Parties 
failed in exactly that way.  But, referring to the statement in 
the Sale Order that the claims were being sold “as is[,] where 
is[,]” they argue that “no stay pending Appeal was necessary 
... because [their legal defenses] were expressly preserved in 
the Sale Order.”  (Reply Br. at 3.)  Thus they say that they 
“did not need to incur the expense associated with seeking a 
stay[.]”  (Id. at 21.)  They provide no legal authority to 
support that extraordinary assertion of an exemption from 
§ 363(m).18  The statutory language is clear and calls for a 
would-be challenger to seek a stay.  11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  Our 
decision in Krebs identifies a safety valve in § 363(m) so that, 
as discussed more fully later, a challenger can argue that the 
sale order in question, though not stayed, nevertheless can be 
appealed because the relief the challenger seeks will not 
undermine the sale.  That very narrow exception is quite 
different than the Pursuit Parties’ claim that they preserved 
their rights in a different way, without seeking a stay.  Our 
responsibility is to apply the statute, not to accommodate the 
                                              
18 Following oral argument, the Pursuit Parties 
submitted a 28(j) letter describing a Tenth Circuit opinion that 
they say is persuasive and proves that one need not obtain a 
stay to avoid mootness if one’s defenses are otherwise 
preserved.  Appellant’s 28(j) letter, June 19, 2017 (discussing 
Paige v. Jubber (In re Paige), 685 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir 
2012)).  That case is inapposite for the reasons discussed infra 
at n.20. 
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Pursuit Parties in their failure to comply with it.  See Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 
1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts – at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it according to its 
terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  They did not 
obtain a stay of the Sale Order, and therefore cannot defeat 
mootness on that basis.   
 
 2. Affecting the Validity of the Sale 
 
The only question left is whether the Pursuit Parties 
can qualify for the safety valve provided in Krebs by showing 
that a reversal or modification of the sale does not affect the 
validity of the sale.  As just noted, when a sale has not been 
stayed, a challenge to that sale will be statutorily moot unless 
a reversal or modification of the sale would not affect the 
validity of the sale.  For obvious reasons, that is a high bar.  A 
challenge to a “central element” of a sale inevitably 
challenges the validity of the sale.  See Pittsburgh Food, 112 
F.3d at 649 (“One cannot challenge the validity of a central 
element of a purchase, the sale price, without challenging the 
validity of the sale itself.” (quoting In re The Charter Co., 
829 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987))).  While challenges to 
specific terms do not always result in § 363(m) mootness, 
“those challenges that would claw back the sale from a good-
faith purchaser” will end in a finding of mootness.  In re ICL 
Holding Co., 802 F.3d at 554. 
 
The “validity of the sale” inquiry gives effect to 
§ 363(m)’s “clear preference in favor of upholding the 
validity of bankruptcy sales without unduly restricting the 
appellant’s right to contest errors of law made by the 
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bankruptcy court.”  In re Brown, 851 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 
2017).  It preserves appellate rights only in those rare 
circumstances where collateral issues not implicating a 
central or integral element of a sale are challenged.  Cf. 
George W. Kuney, Slipping Into Mootness, Norton Ann. 
Surv. of Bankr. L. Part I, § 3 (West 2007) (recognizing that it 
is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the 
validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning 
only when “collateral” issues are challenged).   In short, the 
validity prong of our test provides “[a] narrow exception 
[that] may lie for challenges to the Sale Order that are so 
divorced from the overall transaction that the challenged 
provision would have affected none of the considerations on 
which the purchaser relied.”  In re Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 
600 F.3d 231, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Krebs, 141 F.3d at 
499).  In our assessment of whether a challenge affects the 
validity of a sale, we “must look to the remedies requested by 
the appellants.”  Krebs, 141 F.3d at 499 (citation omitted).   
 
 Some examples are instructive.  In Krebs, we held that 
an appeal was statutorily moot when the car dealership for 
which the case is named tried to purchase a debtor’s Jeep 
franchise in a chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Id. at 492.  That 
agreement was eventually rejected by the bankruptcy court 
and the franchise was sold through an auction.  Id. at 493.  
Krebs did not obtain a stay.  Id. at 497.  Though it was the 
ultimate purchaser at the auction, Krebs appealed the decision 
to reject the original agreement.  The district court affirmed.  
Id. at 493.  We then concluded that the appeal was moot 
under § 363(m).  We stated that the remedy sought, a ruling 
that rejection of the original agreement was improper, would 
“[n]aturally ... have an impact on the validity of the auction 
sale ... because reversing the rejection would necessarily 
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require reversing the subsequent assumption and assignment 
of the underlying franchises.  Clearly, this remedy is not 
permitted by section 363(m).”  Id. at 499.  Krebs had not 
obtained a stay, the case was moot, and we dismissed it.  Id.   
 
A case from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit also decided that a challenge to a sale was 
moot because it implicated an integral part of the sale.  In In 
re Trism Inc., the bankruptcy court approved an order that 
authorized the sale of Trism’s assets to Bed Rock, Inc.  328 
F.3d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003).  The sale order released 
“Bed Rock, Bed Rock’s principal owner and president ... and 
CIT Group/Business Credit, Inc. ... from all avoidance 
liability.”  Id.  A group of unsecured creditors appealed that 
order and release of liability, and the Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel dismissed the appeal as moot under § 363(m).  Id.  The 
Eighth Circuit agreed that the appeal was moot, concluding 
that the release of liability was “integral to the sale of Trism’s 
assets to Bed Rock.”  Id. at 1007.  That was because “the ... 
Agreement conditioned the closing of the sale upon the 
bankruptcy court entering an order providing that [Bed 
Rock’s president] would have no liability to Trism’s estate or 
the [unsecured creditors] ... [and] CIT’s release ... is directly 
linked to absolving [the president] from liability.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the court ruled that 
reversal would affect the validity of the sale and the appeal 
was moot. 
 
We reached a different outcome in In re ICL, 802 F.3d 
at 553-54.  There, the United States government, asserting a 
tax interest in sale proceeds, challenged the sale of a debtor’s 
assets.  The purchasers agreed to fund winding-down costs of 
the company, and the money for that purpose was placed in 
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escrow until winding-down was completed.  Id. at 550-52.  
The government also challenged an agreement between 
lenders to place in trust certain monies for the benefit of 
unsecured lenders.  Id.  The government received nothing 
under those proposals.  Id.  The bankruptcy court rejected the 
government’s arguments, approved both agreements, and 
denied a request for a stay of the sale.  Id. at 552.  On appeal, 
we addressed “whether we c[ould] give the [g]overnment the 
relief it s[ought] – ‘a redistribution’ of the escrowed funds” 
and trust monies – “without disturbing the sale.”  Id. at 554.  
The lenders argued that the relief could not be granted 
without affecting the validity of the sale because such 
reallocation “w[ould] change a fundamental term of the 
transaction” and deprive them of key, bargained-for terms.  
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  We rejected 
those arguments, stating that § 363(m) “stamps out only those 
challenges that would claw back the sale from a good-faith 
purchaser.”  Id.  On those facts, the specific remedy the 
government wanted would not undermine the validity of the 
sale, so we decided that the appeal was not moot under 
§ 363(m).  Id. 
 
 With that background, we assess whether the remedy 
sought in this case can be granted without impacting the 
sale’s validity.  If it cannot, then the appeal is moot.  The 
Pursuit Parties describe the remedy they want as “a finding 
that the Trustee lacked authority to sell avoidance powers[.]”  
(Opening Br. at 53.)  Alternatively – though it amounts to the 
same thing here – they argue for a ruling that avoidance 
powers “d[o] not belong to the estate and may not as a matter 
of law or policy [be] transfer[red] to the Creditors.”  (Opening 
Br. at 55 (citation omitted).)  The Pursuit Parties assert that 
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we can make those legal rulings without affecting the validity 
of the sale.     
 
Both of those arguments share a common 
denominator: they differentiate between the ability to pursue 
a claim and the ownership of the claim.  The Pursuit Parties 
say that the Creditor Group will continue to own the claim 
they bought, regardless of whether we rule that the Creditor 
Group lacks the power to prosecute it or that the claim is not 
an avoidance claim at all.  And, as the Pursuit Parties see it, 
ownership of the claim, even without the ability to pursue it 
as an avoidance claim, does not affect the sale’s validity 
because, again, there was an agreed-to “as is, where is” 
disclaimer included in the final sale agreement.  In colloquial 
terms, the Creditor Group purchased a “pig in a poke” and 
assumed the risk that the “poke” would not contain what had 
been hoped.    
 
But, at least as to this appeal of the Sale Order, that 
reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny.  If we agreed with the 
Pursuit Parties and ruled now that the avoidance powers did 
not transfer with the claims themselves,19 our ruling would 
surely affect the validity of the sale in the sense that the 
                                              
19 In assessing this aspect of statutory mootness, we 
emphasize that we are not deciding whether the sale 
transferred a valid avoidance claim.  Whether avoidance 
powers can be transferred is a question before the Bankruptcy 
Court now and one we may confront on another day.  At this 
juncture, we are assuming without deciding that those powers 
can be and were transferred in this case, and we do so solely 
for the disposition of this particular appeal.  
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ability to pursue a claim is essential to any meaningful 
transfer of such an asset.  As the Trustee explained:  
 
[t]he Creditor Group’s ability to pursue the 
Claims was a central element of the sale of 
these Claims.  It would have made no sense for 
the Trustee or the Creditor Group to enter into 
the Sale Agreement if any of them believed that 
the Creditor Group was legally barred from … 
bringing the Claims. 
 
(Answering Br. at 21.)   
 
We agree.  To hold otherwise would allow a “claw 
back” of the sale itself because the value of the claims, 
without the ability to prosecute them, would be completely 
eliminated and a central feature of the transaction would thus 
be frustrated, through no apparent fault of the Creditor Group.  
See, e.g., Pieper, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 
390 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
defendant’s expressed principal purpose for entering an 
agreement was substantially frustrated by the failure of basic 
assumption of the agreement, defeating the commercial 
reason for contract); Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. 
Supp. 2d 623, 635 (D.N.J. 1998) (recognizing frustration of 
purpose where an unexpected regulatory change 
“substantially frustrate[d] the principal purpose of the 
Agreement to the unfair advantage of one party”); 30 
Williston on Contracts § 77:95 (4th ed. 2017) (explaining that 
the “purpose of the commercial frustration doctrine is to do 
equity,” and that it excuses performance “when the parties’ 
overall contractual intent and objectives have been 
completely thwarted”).  We agree with the District Court that 
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“a finding that the Trustee lacked authority to transfer the 
causes of action ... ‘would affect its validity’ and demonstrate 
that the sale was flawed.”  (JA at 55 (citation omitted).)  We 
therefore reject the Pursuit Parties’ arguments and hold that 
we cannot give them the remedy they seek without affecting 
the validity of the sale.  Because we cannot do that, this 
appeal is statutorily moot.20 
                                              
20 The Pursuit Parties submitted a 28(j) letter relying 
on In re Paige, 685 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2012).  In that case, 
a defendant in an adversary proceeding appealed from a 
bankruptcy court’s judgment.  The bankruptcy court had ruled 
that a domain name registered to the defendant belonged to a 
bankruptcy debtor’s estate and was thus subject to a sale 
agreement between a bankruptcy trustee and a purchaser of 
the domain name.  Id. at 1164-66, 1169-70.  Notably, the 
defendant did not appeal the sale approval order itself.  Id. at 
1170.  The sale agreement contained a provision that delayed 
a final closing on the domain name until a final and 
nonappealable order was issued.  Id. at 1174.  But the 
purchaser waived that provision following the bankruptcy 
court’s judgment and took ownership of the domain name.  
Id. 
The defendant sought to stay that judgment order, and 
the bankruptcy court denied the request.  Id.  The district 
court affirmed, but in the alternative ruled that the appeal was 
moot under § 363(m).  Id. at 1175.  On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit agreed with the defendant that the appeal was not 
moot because the purchaser “took the Domain Name Assets 
subject to [the defendant’s] defenses, ‘pending a ruling on 
such defenses in the Pending Adversary [proceeding].’”  Id. at 
1190 (citation omitted).  In essence, because the purchaser 
took title before a final and nonappealable order had issued, it 
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III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing conclusions, we will dismiss the 
Pursuit Parties’ appeal of the Sale Order as statutorily moot 
under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). 
 
                                                                                                     
“accepted the risk that [the defendant] could still prevail on 
the defenses it retained under the Sale Order.”  Id. at 1191.  
So, § 363(m) did not strip the defendant of those defenses.  
Id. 
The Pursuit Parties argue that, despite not being 
binding, In re Paige is persuasive because the facts are 
parallel to this case.  At this point, however, the case is 
simply inapposite.  Unlike this case, the defendant in In re 
Paige had already defended the adversary proceeding on the 
merits, a judgment was issued against it, and then it 
challenged the bankruptcy court’s rulings.  Nothing we say 
here is meant to limit the Bankruptcy Court from addressing 
issues that are rightly before it in the first instance.     
